




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Yugoslavia: Trends in Ethnic Nationalism

An Intelligence Assessment

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September 1981



Yugoslavia: Trends in Ethnic Nationalism

Key Judgments

*Information available
as of 30 August 1983
not used in this report*

Yugoslavia, created largely by victorious powers after World War I rather than through any internal consolidation, has never achieved the domestic legitimacy enjoyed by most Western states because of unresolved rivalries among its diverse peoples and regions. The intensity of ethnic rivalry has been increasing since the death of Josip Broz (Tito) in 1980 because the cumbersome decentralized system Tito bequeathed is beset by economic crisis—reflected in a widening gap between the prosperous north and the poorer south—and a growing perception among Yugoslav peoples that their collective leadership is inadequate. In addition, ethnic rivalries are being exacerbated by polemics in the country's lively press, the increasing tendency of religious leaders to link matters of faith with ethnic interests, and the attraction of ethnic nationalism to Yugoslavia's dissatisfied youth.

The devolution of power to the republics and provinces in recent years has strengthened the dominant nationality in each. In the process, minorities have become restive and increasingly look to either their "home" republics or their national churches for support rather than to the federal government. We believe that the resulting ethnic strains may eventually focus on fundamental issues such as how Yugoslavia is ruled.

In our judgment, the most serious of Yugoslavia's ethnic strains is the Serbs' perceived drive for restored dominance and the more or less united opposition to it by Yugoslavia's other nationalities. With federal leaders faltering, prominent Serbs are calling for recentralization of the party and the economy to reverse a decade and a half of decentralization in the federal system and, in the process, to expand Serbian authority. The non-Serbs see the proposals as a threat to their much-prized autonomy, insist on maintaining the status quo, and conspire to undermine Serbian designs. The Serbs' disadvantage is that, alone among the nationalities, they are perceived as seeking hegemony over the system, rather than—like the rest—autonomy within it.

We are monitoring four major fronts of ethnic strife:

- *Serb-Croat* animosity—the country's most critical traditional dispute—is under control but increasing in intensity. Croats staunchly uphold regional autonomy, and some nationalists even espouse outright independence from the federation.

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- In *Bosnia-Herzegovina*, long an arena of Serbian-Croatian rivalry, federal creation of a "Muslim" nationality, intended to dampen Serbian-Croatian competition for control of the republic, has instead encouraged a new "nation" to seek regional dominance.
- The situation in *Kosovo* is currently the most violence prone. Military occupation has kept the lid on since Albanian riots in 1981, but local Serbs bitterly resent pressures from Kosovo Albanians that they and Montenegrins leave Kosovo. Moreover, agitation from Albanian dissidents for an "ethnically pure" Albanian Kosovo—a model, perhaps, for Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina—has stirred up Albanian nationalism in neighboring Macedonia—where Albanians are 20 percent of the population—and in a few regions in Montenegro.
- The *Slovenes* also are becoming increasingly nationalistic. Primarily concerned with keeping their relatively privileged economic status, they want to avoid a further drain of their resources to poorer Yugoslav regions and to block Serbian efforts to recentralize power in Belgrade.

We do not see signs—such as concurrent anti-Serb demonstrations by Muslims, Croats, and Albanians—that widespread ethnic violence is imminent. The authorities probably can successfully rely on verbal attacks against nationalism in general, on selective repression of the most radical nationalists, and on the deterrent effect of the specter of intervention by the military which, with its cohesive officer corps and well-disciplined ranks, is less rent by ethnic tension than society as a whole.

Nevertheless, ethnic tensions and mutual distrust will grow, in our view, as party and government authorities quarrel over regional prerogatives and rival ethnic aspirations. In particular, the situations in Kosovo and western Macedonia are likely to stay highly volatile because the Albanian populace will probably exert greater pressure for a Kosovo republic as an ethnic homeland. In the longer run, therefore, we foresee the further intensification of ethnic strife and erosion of the central government's legitimacy leading to more serious threats to Yugoslav stability.

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Contents

	Page
Key Judgments	iii
Introduction	1
Reasons for Upsurge in Ethnic Nationalism	1
Waning Central Government Control	2
Economic Problems	3
The Churches	4
Croat Catholicism	4
Serbian Orthodoxy	4
Islam	7
The Media and Cultural Expression	7
Youth	8
The Main Rivalries	9
The Serbs' Special Position	9
The Serb-Croat Rivalry	10
Muslim Nationalism	12
The Albanians	12
The Slovenes	13
Outlook	14

Figure 1
Yugoslavia: Regional and Ethnic Makeup



Yugoslavia: Trends in Ethnic Nationalism

Introduction

Yugoslavia is a multinational state created largely by victorious foreign powers from the ashes of the Turkish and Austro-Hungarian empires after World War I. Although the Serbs are the only Yugoslav people with the number and drive to seek countrywide hegemony, their dominance has never been accepted by Croats, Albanians, and other minorities that constitute present-day Yugoslavia (see figure 1). Yugoslav ethnonational rivalries are amplified by the country's fragmented, and often adversary, economic, social, and cultural relationships. In its short history, Yugoslavia's cohesiveness has been tenuous, owing much in the post-World War II era to the personal leadership of Josip Broz (Tito).

Highpoints in Yugoslav Ethnic Problems Since 1918

1918	Yugoslavia created under Serbian dynasty.
1928	Political turmoil between ethnic groups results in assassination of Croat parliamentary leader.
1929-30	King Alexander dissolves parliament and revokes democratic rights.
1934	Croatian nationalist assassinates Alexander in Marseille.
1939	Prince Paul attempts to win over Croats by giving them limited autonomy. Serbs riot.
1941	Axis invasion splinters Yugoslavia. Independent Croatian fascist state, Serbian nationalists, and Communist forces begin civil war, which claims 600,000 Yugoslav lives.
1944-48	Consolidation of the Tito regime.
1948	Riots by Albanian nationalists in Macedonia and Kosovo.
1971	Tito's purge of nationalist Croatian leadership.
1972	Tito purges Serbian leadership of nationalists and liberals.
1981	Renewed rioting by Albanian nationalists in Kosovo.
1983	Trial of Muslim nationalists in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The post-Tito leadership is facing a resurgence of ethnic tensions signaled by major riots that broke out in Kosovo in 1981. These riots involved at least nine deaths, the arrest of hundreds of ethnic Albanians,

and provoked a military occupation of the province that continues today. They resulted in a Serbian nationalist backlash and subsequent nationalist expressions by Muslims, Albanians, and Slovenes that were caused, we believe, by non-Serbian fears of resurgent Serbian chauvinism. As a result, many Yugoslav politicians and intellectuals have recently confided privately and have even made pessimistic public statements that there may be no cure for the country's internal divisions.

This paper assesses the factors leading to renewed ethnic tensions in the post-Tito period, describes the interplay of Yugoslavia's ethnic rivalries, and analyzes the likely impact of ethnic problems on the country's political stability. It supplements the analysis of Yugoslavia's political and economic systems in January 1983, *Yugoslavia: An Approaching Crisis?* and in December 1982, *Yugoslavia: The Strains Begin To Tell*.

Reasons for Upsurge in Ethnic Nationalism

A number of developments have heightened Yugoslavia's traditionally tense ethnic rivalries since Tito's death in 1980. These include:

- The perceived political weakness of Tito's successors.
- An economic crisis that has worsened traditional north-south income differentials to the further disadvantage of Kosovo, the southern republics of Macedonia, Montenegro, and Bosnia-Herzegovina; and southern Serbia.
- Burgeoning efforts by ethnic religious leaders to link ethnic and religious interests.
- Greater freedom for the media and cultural leaders to address controversial ethnic topics.
- Increasing disaffection among Yugoslav youth.

In the 1981 census, 1.2 million citizens—a modest 5 percent of the total population, but 345 percent more than in 1971—described themselves as "Yugoslavs without nationality." Citizens could identify themselves as members of 25 ethnic minorities or as "Yugoslavs without nationality" in the 1981 census. No adequate explanation of the phenomenon has been offered, but we doubt that it signifies any major decrease in the south Slavs' allegiance to their ethnic groups. Some Yugoslavs, rather, may have acted in protest: the failure of the federal leadership to set effective policies.

The phenomenon, in any case, caused a controversy which various spokesmen have tried to dampen by explaining it away. Some official commentators offered prosaic interpretations, postulating that children of mixed marriages chose to be "Yugoslavs" or that the complicated census form caused confusion and statistical aberrations. One commentator in Bosnia hypothesized that Muslim Slavs uncomfortable with the new Islamic religious fervor in Bosnia-Herzegovina chose instead to be "Yugoslavs."

The controversy has involved some who hope that the increase in "Yugoslavs" is leading to a more unified populace. One Serb commentator recently expressed

the hope that "Yugoslav" patriotism could become a "political unifier" of the country's ethnic mosaic, like the "melting pot" effect often attributed to Americanization of ethnic groups in the United States. Arguing to the contrary, Dusan Bilandzic, a Croat professor in Zagreb, condemned the new trend because some "Yugoslavs" favor a unitarist (Serbian) state. Several other self-appointed ethnic spokesmen hinted broadly at chicanery in compiling census data; an exceptional delay in publishing detailed census data fuels these suspicions.

Yugoslav research on the new trend produced some results that suggest the new "Yugoslavs" are the "outs" in society. Borba, a daily which often reflects federal party policy, in March 1983 published a study which asserted that "Yugoslavs" are proportionately underrepresented in the party and that their numbers decline sharply in higher party organs. "Yugoslavs" apparently are no more "progressive" than other citizens. A study in Danas also found that, although more students claimed "Yugoslav" identity than in 1971, "Yugoslav" students declined slightly in percentage of the total student population during that period. We believe these results suggest that the new "Yugoslav" is too few in number and too far from power to wield political clout any time soon.

Waning Central Government Control

Most important, in our view, is the perceived political weakness of Tito's successors, which has created a power vacuum. Tito developed one of the most decentralized political-economic systems in Europe, in part to deny any of Yugoslavia's nationalities cause to leave the federation. Even the party, in effect, devolved into eight autonomous units at the republican and provincial level. Although the nationality issue was never solved, the system worked because Tito periodically intervened to keep his proconsuls and their national constituencies in line. Now, with Tito dead and many of these proconsuls either dead or in eclipse, the problems inherent in the Yugoslav system are beginning to show. Polls taken by local publications

indicate that Yugoslavs lack

faith in the central government's efforts to solve the country's serious economic and social problems. Yugoslavs are looking increasingly to their ethnic leaders to get things done.

Without Tito to orchestrate the regime, squabbles among parochial regional representatives on federal party and government organs are increasing. The collective state presidency contains one member from each republic and province, while its counterpart in the party has two members from each republic, and one each from Kosovo and Vojvodina. The Federal Assembly, which is becoming more active in Yugoslavia's legislative process, is dominated by regional



Prime Minister Milka Planinc

delegations openly dependent on instructions from local capitals. Only the Federal Executive Council—the country's cabinet—is more representative of technical expertise than regional political balance. As a result, perhaps, Prime Minister Milka Planinc may be the one leader popularly credited


with serving overall Yugoslav interests

Although regional and ethnic interests are not always identical, the decentralization issue cuts across both. According to contributors to the scholarly journal *Sociologija*, decentralization has devolved power to authoritarian regional bureaucracies at the expense of grass-roots democracy. Viewed this way, the concentration of power in the six republics and two provinces has strengthened the dominant nationality in each and created centers of power to which fellow nationals in other regions can look. Minorities within a particular republic or province—Serbs in Croatia or Kosovo, for example—increasingly seek support either from their "home" republics or their national churches rather than from the federal government.

Economic Problems

The weakened collective leadership is having difficulties dealing with regional economic disparities, thus intensifying debate within ethnic communities over


Figure 2
Yugoslavia: Unemployment, 1981



the wisdom of consensus decisionmaking (see figures 2 and 3). For instance, in 1965, Belgrade vowed to ameliorate the split between the relatively prosperous north and the poorer south by launching a federal aid program with contributions from the richer republics and Vojvodina to the poorer republics and Kosovo (see figure 4). However, since 1980, Slovenia has been trying to limit its obligations to the fund, to eliminate Bosnia-Hercegovina and Macedonia as "underdeveloped" fund recipients, and to substitute enterprise-to-enterprise aid for federal programs. In 1983, Slovenia, Serbia, Croatia, and Vojvodina did not meet their obligations to the fund and temporarily forced its bankruptcy in March. We believe that failures to fulfill commitments to the south in the future, which seem likely given the general decline of the economy, would increase the risk of nationalist outbreaks in Kosovo, Montenegro, Macedonia, and Bosnia-Hercegovina.

Figure 3
Yugoslavia: Per Capita Income, 1982

Thousand US \$



Although the federal government recently passed laws designed to increase its economic authority, republics and provinces continue to promote autarkic, inefficient investment strategies and regional protectionism. In 1978,

only 3 percent of total investment moved between Yugoslavia's constituent republics and provinces and only 15 percent crossed municipal borders. Press articles complain that interrepublic trade, which fell from 28 percent of overall circulation of goods and services in 1970 to 22 percent in 1980, is continuing to decline. In addition, electric power, railroads, and other basic transport and utility industries remain controlled at the regional level. Bosnia-Herzegovina, which has complained about Yugoslav airline service, recently proposed creating its own carrier.

The Churches

Yugoslavia's three major churches are making a comeback after years of losing struggles with federal or regional party barons (see figure 5). Events outside Yugoslavia—such as the spread of Pan-Islamic ideas and the election of John Paul II, the first Pope with

experience in combating ruling Communist parties—undoubtedly contribute to this resurgence. But we believe that the more telling factor is the clergies' increasing inclination to link their churches with the political goals of their ethnic constituencies. A recent federal party conference on religion concluded that there has been "an obvious trend to identify religious affiliation with national feeling, which sometimes leads to nationalism and even to irredentism."

Croat Catholicism. The Catholic Church, which steadfastly holds to its claim to be the true protector of Croat nationhood, and the Yugoslav regime are old and bitter adversaries. The Church received a considerable boost in December 1982 as a result of the elevation of Zagreb Archbishop Kuharic, an avowed Croatian nationalist, to the rank of cardinal. Kuharic staunchly defended the Church from an anticlerical campaign in 1981-82 led by Jakov Blazevic, a hard-liner on the Croatian party central committee.

have described his views on history as containing "scarcely concealed anti-Serb sentiments."

the Croatian and federal governments tried to convince the Pope not to elevate Kuharic because of Kuharic's nationalist views. The Croatian government has publicly admonished Kuharic to behave responsibly in his new office.

Serbian Orthodoxy. The principal church of the Serbian nation is also enjoying a modest reinvigoration. Patriarch German, has mentioned frustrations with the political system as the main cause, but Yugoslav officials say that nationalist activism among the clergy is also responsible. Church leaders, for example, have been particularly vocal in condemning Albanian excesses in Kosovo, and they also stress their concern for Serbs living in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. A measure of the Serbian church's successes in capitalizing on the linkage between religious belief and national feeling is the steady increase in Serbian minisepts, which rededicate themselves to Orthodox fundamentals and traditional Serbian culture.

Figure 4
Yugoslavia: Relative Population and Wealth by Republic





Figure 5
Yugoslavia: Historical Religious Communities



To some non-Serbs, the Serbian church's reviving role is seen as the dangerous manifestation of Serbian chauvinism. Orthodoxy in Yugoslavia is, for example, a major arena for rivalry between the Serbs and the Macedonians—Macedonia was called Southern Serbia between the world wars. The Macedonian Orthodox clergy split with the Serbian Orthodox church,

establishing an autonomous Macedonian church in 1959 and a completely independent church in 1967. Some Serbs rioted against the new church, and the Serbian Orthodox hierarchy refused to recognize it.

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This split between the Serbian and the Macedonian Orthodox has lent itself to regime manipulation to keep the Serbian church in its place, but at the cost of perpetuating tensions between Serbs and Macedonians. Federal authorities quickly recognized first the autonomous and then the independent Macedonian church. In March 1983 the federal government further irritated Serbs by appointing a Macedonian priest to head the government-sponsored Federation of Yugoslav Priests. Government officials have recently repeated calls for Serbian recognition of Macedonian Orthodox autocephality.

Islam. Islam in Yugoslavia has played an important role in a broader Muslim reawakening. Benefiting from the benign neglect of the authorities over the past decade, Muslims have tried to establish an identity between Islamic belief and political movements that work against the interests of the Yugoslav federation. The Islamic clergy is upgrading religious instruction and has established many ties with Islamic communities abroad. More than 150 Yugoslav Muslims pursue Islamic studies in the Middle East each year, and there are an unknown number of foreign students in Yugoslav *medresa*.^{*} Some of these foreign students, according to recent accusations by a top leader in Sarajevo, serve as links to radical "Muslim brotherhoods" in the Middle East.

Yugoslav authorities have been slow to react to the warning signals of growing Muslim assertiveness, probably in part because of Yugoslavia's close ties with the Third World Islamic states. However, a recent flurry of official attacks on Muslim nationalists may well presage the end of favored treatment for Islam in Yugoslavia. Two Islamic clergymen were among the Muslim nationalists arrested this spring for advocating Muslim separatism, and public attacks on foreign-based Islamic revolutionaries are on the rise. We believe that the primary impact of any crackdown would be felt in Bosnia-Herzegovina, where rival Catholic and Serbian clergy will see opportunities to use the issue of Muslim-Islamic nationalism for their own advantage.

^{*} *Medresa* are institutions for higher Islamic education and are located in Sarajevo, Pristina, and Skopje.

The Media and Cultural Expression

Since Tito's death in 1980, journalists, writers, and dramatists have enjoyed new freedoms to broach themes once held too controversial for public consumption. Because editorial decisions are usually made in regional capitals, the new themes often counterpose local ethnic interests with those of rival regions and nationalities. After the Kosovo riots, for example, Serbia's press charged that the militia in Kosovo aided Albanians while oppressing Serbs and Montenegrins. Pristina papers denied the charges and accused the Belgrade press of Serbian chauvinism. Federal authorities seem powerless to stop such polemics, despite their repeated warnings against journalistic irresponsibility.

Writers and playwrights also are contributing to heightened ethnic tensions. For example, the play *Golubnjaka (Pigeon Pitt)*, dealing with wartime atrocities committed against Serbs by Croats, created such a controversy last fall and winter that the director of the Serb National Theater in Novi Sad was fired because he allowed it to be performed. Yet the play has since been produced in several Serbian and Slovenian cities. A best-selling novel, *Knife*, recently published in Belgrade, graphically details Muslim murders of Serbs (see inset). The book also postulates that Muslim war criminals have infiltrated the present power structure in Bosnia and are biding their time until another round against the Serbs.

The federal party has closed several small publishing houses, and there have been personnel changes at *Danas*, *Politika*, and some smaller papers. But two consecutive central committee plenums in February and March failed to agree on a tougher information and cultural policy.

The party's failure to stop the advertisement of ethnic disputes in the media demonstrates its general inability to reach difficult decisions on divisive issues.

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From Knife by Vuk Draskovic

In 1831 Sultan Mahmud ordered Namlık Pasha, the Bosnian vezir, to lower taxes for Christians and allow them to rebuild their destroyed churches. The vezir summoned all Muslim leaders to Travnik and ordered them to observe the Sultan's wishes. Five begs from Hercegovina accepted the new decrees. The rest, from Bosnia, rebelled and recruited forces to fight the Sultan. The Bosnian Muslims considered the new decrees an attack on Islam and a concession to infidels. They called up a large army to move against the Hercegovinian begs who remained loyal to Istanbul.

The Hercegovinian begs were much weaker, for each of them twenty men were in the field. Turhan-beg led the Bosnians into battle waving his saber, with the cry "Brother Turks, spill the blood of the Serbs! All are infidels! Forward my falcons! Who dies in battle with unbelievers enters heaven. Forward for Mohamed's faith!"

Hasan-beg of Trebinje, leader of the Hercegovinian forces, raised them by appealing to the Serbs. He called them to battle with the cry "My people, brothers, and falcons! Forward for the Holy Cross and Saint John!" If he had not done so, the battle was

lost. As it turned out, confusion spread in the ranks of Bosnian rebels and both flanks retreated in the belief the other had left the field. A general rout followed, with total victory for the Hercegovinians.

One of the victorious begs, Ali-Aga from Stolac, who kissed the cross and rushed into battle with it in his hand, was later rewarded by promotion to vezir. All of the Christians in Hercegovina assembled in Mostar to honor his appointment and to recognize him as their benefactor and savior.

On the same day of this ceremony, Ali-Aga ordered four Serbs executed. They were impaled alive and hung in agony for three days cursing the faith of Mohamed. From then on Ali-Aga loosed a rein of terror against the Serbs. He ordered that the walls of his palace in Mostar be decorated with Serbian heads so that from any position, even reclining, he could see them. He took special pleasure in witnessing executions during meals. During his twenty-year rule, a day never passed without at least a hundred and fifty Serb heads hanging on his palace walls, with their eyes turned toward his quarters.

Youth

We believe that the declining employment prospects—at present about 75 percent of the country's 900,000 unemployed are under 30 and looking for their first job—are increasing the attraction of nationalism as a form of antiestablishment behavior among Yugoslav youth, especially the university trained. Moreover, the government now projects that economic austerity will continue through 1989, probably ensuring that youth unemployment will be virtually unworkable until then. Young persons' identification with the system through entree into and mobility up through the political bureaucracy also offers little hope because those in place are loath to give way.

Branko Mikulic, the Bosnian leader, has expressed what we believe is a growing fear among Yugoslav leaders: the younger generation is more loyal to

ethnic, material, and religious values rather than to Yugoslav and socialist ones. Albanian young people—52 percent of Kosovo's population is under age 19—were the principal participants in the 1981 riots and subsequent agitations. Since then, Croatian students, some overtly sympathetic to the Kosovars, increasingly have sparked nationalist disturbances at basketball games and in medical faculties and dormitories at Croat universities; Jure Bilic, then president of the Croatian party presidium, complained in December 1982 of a "nationalist mosaic" among Croatian youth. Kosovar and Croatian nationalism, in turn, have

helped to energize Serbian youth. Outraged officials protest crude posters in Serbian schools that encourage students to "make a check if you hate Albanians" and the fashion among Serbian youths to wear caps in the style of chetniks (World War II Serbian anti-Communists).

Yugoslav officials have reacted to the youth problem by increasing pressures on educators. Hamdija Pozderac, Bosnia's party president, recently claimed that some local schools add to the problem by segregating students according to national origin. The Bosnia-Herzegovina party central committee, meanwhile, has complained that curriculums foster "the nationalist point of view." In Kosovo, 200 out of 480 people fired from their jobs in the first three months after the riots were teachers. The Communist organization of the University of Pristina in Kosovo in January 1983 called for even greater purges.



Dragoslav Markovic, president of League of Communists of Yugoslavia

The Main Rivalries

Declining federal authority, troublesome economic disparity, and a more vocal press are, in our view, renewing the scramble for power among ethnic groups harboring deep-seated suspicions of out-group goals and motivations. We believe that competition between Serbs and non-Serbs is the key factor in this new wave of ethnic nationalism. Serbs claim they are on the defensive, attempting only to protect the Yugoslav federation and their constitutional authority in their autonomous provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina.

many non-Serbs believe that the Serbs want to restore their position of preeminence throughout the country. Non-Serbs, through press commentary and in Federal Assembly debates, express their determination to protect their constitutional autonomy.

The Serbs' Special Position

Alone among the nationalities, the Serbs are perceived to seek hegemony over the system rather than the less difficult goal of autonomy within it. Even at its height before World War II, Serb dominance was contested fiercely. Serbian vulnerability as Yugoslavia's dominant ethnic group stems from its taking charge as a result of decisions in 1919 by Allied

victors who were grateful for the Serbs' role in World War I rather than as a consequence of internal political or military victories.

The historical distrust between Serbs and non-Serbs has divisive repercussions in the party leadership. in June 1982 non-Serbs unsuccessfully tried to block the elevation of Dragoslav Markovic, a Serb leader known for his nationalist sentiments, as Serbia's representative on the party presidium. In June 1983 Markovic became president of the party after Serbia nominated him to serve the one-year rotational term. The non-Serbs, who reportedly opposed this promotion also, became even more suspicious of Serb designs.

Markovic, in fact, has been consistently pressing for proposals that would, in effect, restore some of Serbia's lost preeminence. During the mid-1970s, for example, he tried to recentralize control over the Kosovo and Vojvodina provinces and was blocked only by Tito. And prior to last year's party congress, Serbia's leaders, including Markovic, made sweeping

proposals for strengthening controls over the regional parties by the federal party, in which the Serbs are the largest bloc. Serbs were blocked by other delegations but, despite the rebuff, a parliamentary commission has been studying recentralizing reforms at Serbia's insistence. Judging from his speeches at recent Central Committee plenums, Markovic is a leading backer of efforts to restore economic decision making to the federal government, a move opponents criticize as presaging political recentralization, a prerequisite to renewed Serb hegemony.

In our judgment, the Serbian leadership's drive for more power is not likely to wane because the political strength of nationalism in Serbia is so strong that most top Serbian leaders have to accommodate to it. Judging from their speeches,

Markovic and his chief rival, Nikola Ljubice, a former Defense Minister who is now president of Serbia, compete with each other for legitimacy as defenders of Serbian rights. And, as in other republics, Serbian officials with reputations for a broader "Yugoslav," rather than local political orientations—like former Foreign Minister Milos Minic—have been pushed by their home constituencies to the political sidelines.

An issue that Serbian leaders have tried to capitalize on to justify their drive for more power is the current dispute with Albanian leaders over the emigration of Serbs and Montenegrins from Kosovo. Most Serbs revere Kosovo, the heart of the ancient Serbian empire and site of its religious monuments, as their national birthplace. Yugoslav officials have told that between 15,000 and 20,000—about 10 percent—of the province's Serbs and Montenegrins left under duress between 1981 and October 1982. In June, *Politika* reported that, on average, 400 Serbs and Montenegrins leave each month. In July, the party daily *Borba* reported a Serbian complaint that emigration has spread to areas of southern Serbia bordering Kosovo. Serbian leaders, as well as Montenegrin and Macedonian officials, blame the exodus on pressure by Albanian nationalists who want to create an ethnically pure Kosovo as a step toward secession and reunion with Albania.



Milutin Batic, president of
Croatian state presidency

The Serb-Croat Rivalry

While Serbian assertiveness remains the focus for current ethnic tensions, and while Kosovo remains the most volatile area, we believe that Croatian opposition to Serbian hegemony remains the most potentially dangerous of the country's ethnic rivalries. While leading Serbs seek to gain preeminence over the Yugoslav state, the Croats, who are the Serbs' staunchest opponents, have always had some leaders who espoused secession from the federation.

There is a long legacy of Serbian mistrust of the Croats, who during World War II established an independent state under German protection. This legacy was reinforced by years of nationalistic policies pursued by Croatian republican leaders who were ousted in a major purge in 1971. Arrests associated with this so-called Croatian mass movement continued for a decade, and the Croatian nationalist cause, despite harsh suppression by the federal leadership, is very much alive. In 1980, many leading Croats signed petitions for the release of their political prisoners.



Dusan Dragosavac, member of
the presidium of the League of
Communists of Yugoslavia

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Adm. Branko Mamula, De-
fense Minister

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The next spring [redacted] a manifesto calling for Croatian independence from an underground "Croatian Communist party."

The Croatian leadership, which has rigorously suppressed Croatian nationalism, is now alarmed that Serbian agitation will strengthen anti-Serb sentiments and undermine its position. Croatian officials have expressed concern at the increasing incidence of nationalist expression at Croatian universities, sometimes in open support of Albanian opposition to Serbian policies in Kosovo. Stipe Suvar, an influential Croat theoretician, recently noted that all other Yugoslav nationalists "hate the Serbs," and he warned that the problem could increase because Serbs are nostalgic for their pre-1941 position. Milutin Baltic, the new president of the Croatian state presidency, warned in May that Serbia's strong response to problems in Kosovo could incite other nationalisms in response [redacted]

Croatian animosity toward Serbs also has a local focus in a perception that the Serb minority in Croatia—living primarily in southwestern and eastern Croatia—is favored politically. The authorities in Zagreb have often admitted that Croatian resentment

of the disproportionate numbers of Serbs in the republican leadership—a residual impact of their greater role as Communist partisans during the war—is a special sore point among Croats. Serbs are heavily represented in the current leadership: Baltic, Dusan Dragosavac, one of the republic's two representatives on the federal party presidium, and Adm. Branko Mamula, Defense Minister, are all Croatian Serbs [redacted]

There is also a strong emigre activity which keeps Croatian nationalism simmering. Nationalist Croatian emigres in Western Europe and the United States are the most active among anti-Yugoslav groups abroad, with most dedicated to restoring an independent Croatian state encompassing boundaries greater than even the 1941-45 wartime puppet state of Croatia. Croatian nationalists, both in Yugoslavia and outside, still claim that Bosnia-Herzegovina is an integral part of the Croatian homeland. Small radical groups have taken the terrorist road. More disturbing to the Yugoslav leadership is the current trend of Croatian emigres to join forces with Albanian counterparts in Western Europe to protest Yugoslav human rights violations and policies in Kosovo. [redacted]

Muslim Nationalism

Serb-Croat rivalry helped produce the growing strain of Muslim nationalism in current Yugoslav ethnic tensions. For hundreds of years, Serbs and Croats both have claimed the "hearts and minds" of the majority of Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the descendants of ethnic Serbs and Croats who converted to Islam during the 500 years of Turkish rule. Ancient hatreds were reinforced during World War II when many Bosnian Muslims sided with the Croats and participated in exterminating Serbs. Yugoslav officials and press observers have noted that to this day Croats and Muslims generally maintain better relations with each other than do Serbs with either group. Federal officials tried to defuse this rivalry before the 1971 census by setting the "Muslims" legally apart as a separate nationality. The move only complicated Yugoslavia's national problems, however, by creating yet another claimant to national self-determination.

The Muslims are pressing to expand their influence as the plurality in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Their current aggressiveness probably is based on resentment of past overrepresentation of Serbs in the institutions of power, somewhat similar to the situation in Croatia. According to 1971 figures, Serbs, who then constituted 37 percent of the population, made up 47 percent of party membership.

an unwritten rule requires that the party presidency still be made up of three Serbs, three Muslims, and two Croats despite declines in the Serb population in the republic.

As evidence of their nationalism, the Yugoslav press reports that Muslim officials from Bosnia-Herzegovina increasingly court Muslim communities in Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Kosovo (see figure 1). In October 1982, for example, Raif Dizdarevic, then president of the Federal Assembly and a leading Bosnian Muslim, visited Kosovo—where the majority Albanians are of Islamic religious extraction—and returned with a report defending Kosovar treatment of Serbs and Montenegrins in the province. He was attacked by Serbian officials, and his report was ignored in a subsequent Assembly resolution, which generally blamed Kosovar pressure for Serb and Montenegrin emigration.



Raif Dizdarevic, former president of the Federal Assembly

The Muslims' growing assertiveness has alarmed some federal leaders, particularly as evidence has grown that some Muslims sympathize with the Iranian revolution. As early as 1979, a Sarajevo official claimed that Ayatollah Khomeini had significant influence in the republic. On 22 March 1983 Branko Mikulic, then president of the republic presidency, attacked "pan-Islamism;"

this was the first statement on the problem by a Bosnian leader in recent memory. In April, Interior Minister Dolanc Muslim nationalists who were arrested on 8 April after a trip to Teheran were supportive of Khomeini's goal of establishing a Muslim state in Bosnia-Herzegovina as an Islamic toehold in Europe.

The Albanians

The Albanians are Yugoslavia's most volatile ethnic community, their most violent outbreak being the 1981 riots in Kosovo, where they are the dominant majority. In addition, they make up 20 percent of the population of Macedonia—concentrated in western Macedonia—and a growing minority in Montenegro.

We believe that the Albanians are deeply influenced by a sense of wrongful separation from their conationals beyond the Yugoslav border. While under Italian occupation during World War II, Albania annexed Kosovo, a development previously supported by Yugoslav Communist Party declarations in 1928 and 1940. But Kosovar hopes for permanent union with Albania were dashed when Tito broke with Stalin in 1948 -- Albania remained a loyal Soviet ally, and Tito was forced to abandon his designs for a Yugoslav-dominated Balkan federation that allowed for a "Greater Albania" component state. Over time, agitation for union with Albania has declined in favor of demands for a separate Yugoslav Kosovo republic, judging from dissident slogans and comments by Yugoslav officials.

The riots in 1981 and subsequent nationalist sloganeering were only the most recent demonstrations of Albanian discontent. The Albanians in Kosovo have resisted Belgrade's attempts to coerce them or to court them with economic subsidies throughout the postwar period. Rebelling during the Communist takeover, they were suppressed by the army until the late 1940s and subsequently kept on a tight leash by Alexander Rankovic, Tito's vice-president and Yugoslavia's principal standard-bearer of Serbian interests. After Rankovic's ouster in 1966, economic aid to the region increased, but it failed to avert serious rioting two years later. In 1974, in part to diffuse this discontent, Kosovo's status was upgraded in the constitution from autonomous region to province. Nonetheless, between 1974 and 1981, 600 ethnic Albanians were arrested for nationalist and irredentist activity.

Tensions have remained high since 1981, although the military occupation has prevented renewed widespread violence. Belgrade tried blaming the provincial party, firing its leader, Mahmut Bakali, and purging local party organizations, particularly the faculty at the University of Pristina. But nothing Belgrade has done has halted clandestine circulation of slogans, such as "Kosovo-Republic" and "Death to Serbian Bloodsuckers," cemetery desecrations, and nationalist excesses, including rapes of Serbian women by Albanians.

The Slovenes

The Slovenes bear no legacy of bitter struggles for independence from Yugoslavia's other ethnic groups, and Slovene leaders support a federation that ensures their access to markets and raw materials in the south. Nevertheless, their relative prosperity is now the cause of a widening rift with other regions and ethnic groups. Slovene leaders, seeking to protect their prosperity, are among the most outspoken opponents to increasing Belgrade's economic authority.

Statements by the republic's leaders illustrate that they are not in sympathy with other Yugoslavs' problems. Andrej Marinc, president of the party presidium, recently extolled Slovene economic superiority, crediting it to superior cadre and farsighted economic strategies. Other Slovenes have proudly pointed out the contrast between Slovenia's energy surplus and the difficulties faced in Macedonia and elsewhere. Top Slovene party officials have argued that other Yugoslav regions should correct their mismanagement practices before seeking relief in federal subsidies, a position that has led to sharp rebuttal from leaders in less developed republics. Kosovars complain that Slovenia acts like an "imperial power" by exploiting Kosovo's resources, paying less than world market prices for raw materials, and charging high prices for its industrial products.

The Slovenes also are becoming less tolerant of "guestworkers" whose growing presence is diluting the once homogenous ethnic environment. Migration of outsiders seeking work in Slovenia is creating interethnic tensions similar to those in West European countries. Guestworkers complain of discrimination, while Slovenes begrudge the increased costs of social insurance and the wages these workers send home. Official relations between Slovenia and Bosnia-Herzegovina are deteriorating because of alleged Slovene mistreatment of Bosnian guestworkers. Slovenia's current five-year plan proposes changes that would decrease the republic's need for non-Slovene labor by stressing high technology, a policy that deliberately works against the federation's ability to increase employment in its less developed regions.

Outlook

Although Yugoslavia's ethnic disputes show every prospect of increasing in intensity, we do not expect immediate, widespread ethnic violence. Because regional officials—who largely support autonomy, not independence, and fear that extremism could lead to another civil war—increasingly speak out for ethnic aspirations, radicals lack the issues with which they might seize the initiative and provoke confrontations.

Moreover, in our view, the ultimate prospect of harsh suppression—perhaps by the military—will deter the public from responding to the most radical nationalists, except perhaps in Kosovo. We believe that the Yugoslav military, despite a predominance of Serbian officers, is less affected by ethnic tension than society as a whole.

95 percent of the country's military officers are members of the party. Although there has been at least one trial of ethnic Albanian recruits who were involved in nationalist activity, there is no evidence of major ethnic problems in the military as a whole or among the occupation forces in Kosovo. We would expect the military's discipline—a characteristic not evident in the party and other Yugoslav institutions—to enable it to overcome any internal ethnic problems in the event it was called on again to intervene to preserve order.

In addition, many Yugoslavs have expressed the fear that a breakdown of order could make the country vulnerable to Soviet political intervention or political manipulation. There is no evidence of Soviet interference in Yugoslavia's ethnic disputes. Nevertheless, in our view, the memory of the break with Stalin and general acceptance of the notion that the Soviet Union is Yugoslavia's primary potential military threat currently helps restrain the centrifugal sentiments of many who might otherwise have little stake in the federation.

Yugoslavia's post-Tito system is prone to indecision. We expect the country's leaders will attempt to "muddle through" their ethnic difficulties, making only those ad hoc decisions absolutely necessary to preserve the country's immediate stability. In the

short run, the party will probably continue its reliance on verbal attacks on nationalism and on selective repression of the most radical nationalists. The Socialist Alliance—the party's mass front organization—is likely to intensify its campaign to propagate popular opposition to nationalist excesses.

This strategy, in our view, may work for a while because most dissidents—many Albanians and some Croats—providing notable exceptions—accept the need for confederation. For now, ethnic leaders are likely to restrain their demands within the existing political system, hoping to take advantage of the post-Tito leadership's weaknesses to increase personal followings.

Nevertheless, ethnic tensions and mutual distrust will grow as party and government authorities quarrel over regional prerogatives and rival ethnic aspirations. The party, fractured along ethnic lines, is especially unlikely to serve a unifying role when important issues divide Yugoslav ethnic groups. In particular, we believe that the central rivalry between Serb and non-Serb will continue to weaken Yugoslav stability for the foreseeable future. A major indicator of the seriousness of this trend will be the extent to which measures to strengthen federal prerogatives are actually implemented in the face of near-certain opposition of Croats, Slovenes, Kosovars, and Bosnian Muslims.

The situation in Kosovo and western Macedonia is likely to stay highly volatile because postriot suppression has driven an even deeper wedge between the Albanian populace and the local political elite. The Kosovo party's ability to control or co-opt Albanian nationalism is diminished because it is now particularly seen as representing outside—chiefly Serbian—interests.

We believe that pressure for republican status in Kosovo will continue to grow; the Albanian birthrate—the highest in Europe—coupled with continuing Serbian and Montenegrin emigration, is rapidly creating an overwhelmingly Albanian province. In addition, we believe that this could increase common anti-Serb interest between Kosovar and Muslim. Any

indication of common organization among these groups would be perceived by federal authorities—and especially by Serbs, Montenegrins, and Macedonians—as a major threat to Yugoslav stability and probably would be dealt with harshly.


Although we believe that ethnic discontent can be contained for now, the Yugoslav situation is and will remain unstable. Certain developments would indicate more acute ethnic discontent than we currently foresee in the short run. In descending order of likelihood, these would be:

- Renewed demonstrations in Kosovo.
- Drastic economic deterioration in the south, creating severe shortages that give radical nationalists more influence in Macedonia, Kosovo, Bosnia-Herzegovina, or southern Serbia.
- Collapse of the economic stabilization program leading to dramatic loss of confidence in the federal government.
- Evidence, such as ad hoc demonstrations or wildcat strikes; that grass-roots agitation, led by disaffected youth, is slipping from the control of present ethnic leaders.
- Joint anti-Serb demonstrations by combinations of Croats, Muslims, and Albanians inside Yugoslavia.
- A stronger Serbian backlash against anti-Serb agitation, perhaps including calls for military intervention to maintain order.

In the longer run, we believe that the stresses of ethnic tensions, combined with north-south economic differences, ethnic argument in the media, and disaffected youth could present the regime with overwhelming challenges to the existing system. In particular, we believe that youth—with encouragement from the Churches—probably will continue to turn away from socialism and toward nationalism. The resulting decline in the regime's legitimacy, especially if combined with inability to restructure adequately the country's inefficient political and economic institutions, could eventually deliver shocks to the system greater even than the 31 Kosovo riots. In sum, although the leadership may "muddle through" its immediate ethnic challenges, ethnic problems will continue to grow. Yugoslavia's long-term stability is likely to depend on the relationship between its endemic ethnic disputes, fragile economic prospects, and cumbersome, decentralized political structures.

Peoples of Yugoslavia

Distribution by Opstina, 1981 Census





Slovenes (7.8%)


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

Vlachs (0.1%)*



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

ITAL










*Persons claiming republic affiliation




SAN
MARINO





Popu



Bosnia & Herzegovina
 (Bosnia and Herzegovina)
 Hrvatska (Croatia)
 Makedonija (Macedonia)
 Crna Gora (Montenegro)
 Srbija (Serbia)
 Slovenija (Slovenia)





*Percent of total Yugoslav population

Peoples of Yugoslavia

1981 Census

	Total	Percent
TOTAL	22,427,585	100.0
Serbs	8,140,507	36.3
Croats	4,428,043	19.7
Muslims	1,998,890	8.9
Slovenes	1,753,571	7.8
Albanians	1,730,876	7.7
Macedonians	1,341,998	6.0
Montenegrins	979,043	4.3
Bulgarians	424,867	1.9
Romany Gypsies	164,197	0.7
Turks	101,291	0.5
Bosnians	80,334	0.4
Rumanians	54,955	0.2
Bulgarians	34,199	0.2
Yugoslavs	32,071	0.1
Ruthenians	23,284	0.1
Czechs	19,824	0.1
Italians	15,122	0.1
Ukrainians	12,812	0.1
Germans	8,712	(?)
Russians	4,447	(?)
Poles	2,043	(?)
Greeks	1,641	(?)
Austrians	1,404	(?)
Others	17,845	0.1

Nationality not declared		
Yugoslavs	1,219,024	5.4
Did not answer	44,701	0.2
Republic affiliation	25,730	0.1
Unknown	153,546	0.7

Less than 0.1 percent
Source: Statistical Bureau 1995, Statistical Yearbook 2002
Statistical Bureau, Belgrade, May 1982

Southwestern Republics (Montenegro)

Country	Total	Percent
Southwestern Republics	10,000,000	100.0
Albanians	1,000,000	10.0
Bosnians	1,000,000	10.0
Bulgarians	1,000,000	10.0
Czechs	1,000,000	10.0
Germans	1,000,000	10.0
Greeks	1,000,000	10.0
Italians	1,000,000	10.0
Japanese	1,000,000	10.0
Koreans	1,000,000	10.0
Latvians	1,000,000	10.0
Lithuanians	1,000,000	10.0
Malaysians	1,000,000	10.0
Mexicans	1,000,000	10.0
Norwegians	1,000,000	10.0
Poles	1,000,000	10.0
Romanians	1,000,000	10.0
Russians	1,000,000	10.0
Slovenes	1,000,000	10.0
Soviet Union	1,000,000	10.0
Swedes	1,000,000	10.0
Swiss	1,000,000	10.0
Turks	1,000,000	10.0
Ukrainians	1,000,000	10.0
USA	1,000,000	10.0
Yugoslavs	1,000,000	10.0

Country	Total	Percent
Albanians	1,000,000	10.0
Bosnians	1,000,000	10.0
Bulgarians	1,000,000	10.0
Czechs	1,000,000	10.0
Germans	1,000,000	10.0
Greeks	1,000,000	10.0
Italians	1,000,000	10.0
Japanese	1,000,000	10.0
Koreans	1,000,000	10.0
Latvians	1,000,000	10.0
Lithuanians	1,000,000	10.0
Malaysians	1,000,000	10.0
Mexicans	1,000,000	10.0
Norwegians	1,000,000	10.0
Poles	1,000,000	10.0
Romanians	1,000,000	10.0
Russians	1,000,000	10.0
Slovenes	1,000,000	10.0
Soviet Union	1,000,000	10.0
Swedes	1,000,000	10.0
Swiss	1,000,000	10.0
Turks	1,000,000	10.0
Ukrainians	1,000,000	10.0
USA	1,000,000	10.0
Yugoslavs	1,000,000	10.0

Southwestern Republics (Croatia)

Country	Total	Percent
Southwestern Republics	10,000,000	100.0
Albanians	1,000,000	10.0
Bosnians	1,000,000	10.0
Bulgarians	1,000,000	10.0
Czechs	1,000,000	10.0
Germans	1,000,000	10.0
Greeks	1,000,000	10.0
Italians	1,000,000	10.0
Japanese	1,000,000	10.0
Koreans	1,000,000	10.0
Latvians	1,000,000	10.0
Lithuanians	1,000,000	10.0
Malaysians	1,000,000	10.0
Mexicans	1,000,000	10.0
Norwegians	1,000,000	10.0
Poles	1,000,000	10.0
Romanians	1,000,000	10.0
Russians	1,000,000	10.0
Slovenes	1,000,000	10.0
Soviet Union	1,000,000	10.0
Swedes	1,000,000	10.0
Swiss	1,000,000	10.0
Turks	1,000,000	10.0
Ukrainians	1,000,000	10.0
USA	1,000,000	10.0
Yugoslavs	1,000,000	10.0

Southwestern Republics (Slovenia)

Country	Total	Percent
Southwestern Republics	10,000,000	100.0
Albanians	1,000,000	10.0
Bosnians	1,000,000	10.0
Bulgarians	1,000,000	10.0
Czechs	1,000,000	10.0
Germans	1,000,000	10.0
Greeks	1,000,000	10.0
Italians	1,000,000	10.0
Japanese	1,000,000	10.0
Koreans	1,000,000	10.0
Latvians	1,000,000	10.0
Lithuanians	1,000,000	10.0
Malaysians	1,000,000	10.0
Mexicans	1,000,000	10.0
Norwegians	1,000,000	10.0
Poles	1,000,000	10.0
Romanians	1,000,000	10.0
Russians	1,000,000	10.0
Slovenes	1,000,000	10.0
Soviet Union	1,000,000	10.0
Swedes	1,000,000	10.0
Swiss	1,000,000	10.0
Turks	1,000,000	10.0
Ukrainians	1,000,000	10.0
USA	1,000,000	10.0
Yugoslavs	1,000,000	10.0

[illegible]

Scaphiophytum flagellatum (L.) Benth.

Country	Population	Per person	Per person
Algeria	32,987	Barrels	4.71
Algeria		1,000 barrels	1.22
Algeria	8,794	1,000 barrels	0.19
Algeria		1,000 barrels	1.51
Algeria		1,000 barrels	1.51
Algeria	46,803	Barrels	13.18
Algeria		1,000 barrels	1.88
Algeria	25,111	1,000 barrels	0.78
Algeria		1,000 barrels	1.15
Algeria	23,873	Barrels	66.44
Algeria		1,000 barrels	1.14
Algeria		1,000 barrels	1.14
Algeria	30,880	Barrels	0.73
Algeria		1,000 barrels	1.43
Algeria	23,383	Barrels	0.71
Algeria	0.744	Barrels	93.57
Algeria		1,000 barrels	4.78
Algeria		1,000 barrels	1.51
Algeria	4,471,113	Barrels	19.82
Algeria		1,000 barrels	1.19
Algeria		1,000 barrels	1.63
Algeria		1,000 barrels	1.25
Algeria	17,838	Barrels	88.77
Algeria		1,000 barrels	2.52
Algeria	35,794	Barrels	66.84
Algeria		1,000 barrels	1.99
Algeria	10,244	Barrels	0.47
Algeria		1,000 barrels	0.89
Algeria	27,878	Barrels	74.88
Algeria		1,000 barrels	12.81
Algeria		1,000 barrels	8.17
Algeria	54,488	Barrels	78.32
Algeria		1,000 barrels	0.44
Algeria		1,000 barrels	0.47
Algeria		1,000 barrels	1.84
Algeria		1,000 barrels	1.88
Algeria	14,198	Barrels	66.41
Algeria		1,000 barrels	27.13
Algeria		1,000 barrels	4.48
Algeria	22,878	Barrels	88.17
Algeria	66,888	Barrels	54.36
Algeria		1,000 barrels	34.78
Algeria		1,000 barrels	1.88
Algeria	140,878	Barrels	66.84
Algeria		1,000 barrels	0.06
Algeria		1,000 barrels	1.08
Algeria	17,088	Barrels	88.62
Algeria	12,988	Barrels	88.78
Algeria		1,000 barrels	1.87
Algeria	8,388	Barrels	88.10
Algeria		1,000 barrels	1.14
Algeria	38,841	Barrels	0.44
Algeria		1,000 barrels	3.18
Algeria		1,000 barrels	2.88
Algeria	26,800	Barrels	34.57
Algeria		1,000 barrels	1.29
Algeria	14,148	Barrels	54.52
Algeria		1,000 barrels	73.08
Algeria	20,862	Barrels	8.28
Algeria		1,000 barrels	94.37
Algeria		1,000 barrels	3.72
Algeria	48,781	Barrels	66.71
Algeria	18,841	Barrels	54.66
Algeria		1,000 barrels	2.33
Algeria		1,000 barrels	2.00
Algeria	50,881	Barrels	88.38
Algeria		1,000 barrels	1.94
Algeria	27,881	Barrels	88.52
Algeria	23,778	Barrels	20.40
Algeria		1,000 barrels	1.88
Algeria		1,000 barrels	1.88
Algeria		1,000 barrels	1.88
Algeria	30,884	Barrels	66.37
Algeria	68,798	Barrels	88.80
Algeria		1,000 barrels	1.88
Algeria	14,287	Barrels	94.11
Algeria		1,000 barrels	3.72
Algeria		1,000 barrels	1.78
Algeria	16,127	Barrels	1.88
Algeria	168,873	Barrels	82.78
Algeria		1,000 barrels	2.34
Algeria		1,000 barrels	1.87
Algeria	121,873	Barrels	83.18
Algeria		1,000 barrels	2.84
Algeria		1,000 barrels	2.18
Algeria	22,838	Barrels	66.87
Algeria		1,000 barrels	1.32
Algeria		1,000 barrels	1.87
Algeria	130,873	Barrels	92.67
Algeria		1,000 barrels	3.68
Algeria	28,478	Barrels	88.61
Algeria		1,000 barrels	2.14
Algeria		1,000 barrels	3.36
Algeria	27,878	Barrels	82.78
Algeria		1,000 barrels	4.91
Algeria		1,000 barrels	1.92
Algeria	17,940	Barrels	34.30
Algeria		1,000 barrels	3.71
Algeria	27,838	Barrels	94.36
Algeria		1,000 barrels	2.87
Algeria	198,001	Barrels	82.78
Algeria		1,000 barrels	1

The figure consists of two line graphs side-by-side. Both graphs have 'Rate of reaction' on the y-axis and 'Temperature' on the x-axis. The left graph shows a curve that starts at a low rate at low temperature and rises very steeply as temperature increases, indicating a high activation energy. The right graph shows a similar curve but with a much more gradual slope, indicating a lower activation energy.

Amsterdam	401 346
Amsterdam, P.O. Box 1	401 346
Amsterdam	73 394
Amsterdam	27 020
Amsterdam	74 440
Amsterdam	34 444
Amsterdam	24 442
Amsterdam	71 444
Amsterdam	74 418
Amsterdam	4 423
Amsterdam	43 444
Amsterdam	32 714
Amsterdam	44 444
Amsterdam	44 444
Amsterdam	24 774
Amsterdam	42 410
Amsterdam	27 470
Amsterdam	74 444
Amsterdam	24 444
Amsterdam	74 444
Amsterdam	42 427
Amsterdam	24 444
Amsterdam	27 414
Amsterdam	70 714
Amsterdam	74 444
Amsterdam	74 444

Scapellato's Autonomous Petroleum

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Country	Year	Population	Area	Population Density	Area Density	Population Density	Area Density	Population Density	Area Density
Algeria	1960	10,000,000	2,381,472	420	17.6	420	17.6	420	17.6
Algeria	1965	11,000,000	2,381,472	462	19.4	462	19.4	462	19.4
Algeria	1970	12,000,000	2,381,472	504	21.2	504	21.2	504	21.2
Algeria	1975	13,000,000	2,381,472	546	23.0	546	23.0	546	23.0
Algeria	1980	14,000,000	2,381,472	588	24.8	588	24.8	588	24.8
Algeria	1985	15,000,000	2,381,472	630	26.6	630	26.6	630	26.6
Algeria	1990	16,000,000	2,381,472	672	28.4	672	28.4	672	28.4
Algeria	1995	17,000,000	2,381,472	714	30.2	714	30.2	714	30.2
Algeria	2000	18,000,000	2,381,472	756	32.0	756	32.0	756	32.0
Algeria	2005	19,000,000	2,381,472	798	33.8	798	33.8	798	33.8
Algeria	2010	20,000,000	2,381,472	840	35.6	840	35.6	840	35.6
Algeria	2015	21,000,000	2,381,472	882	37.4	882	37.4	882	37.4
Algeria	2020	22,000,000	2,381,472	924	39.2	924	39.2	924	39.2
Algeria	2025	23,000,000	2,381,472	966	41.0	966	41.0	966	41.0
Algeria	2030	24,000,000	2,381,472	1,008	42.8	1,008	42.8	1,008	42.8
Algeria	2035	25,000,000	2,381,472	1,050	44.6	1,050	44.6	1,050	44.6
Algeria	2040	26,000,000	2,381,472	1,092	46.4	1,092	46.4	1,092	46.4
Algeria	2045	27,000,000	2,381,472	1,134	48.2	1,134	48.2	1,134	48.2
Algeria	2050	28,000,000	2,381,472	1,176	50.0	1,176	50.0	1,176	50.0
Algeria	2055	29,000,000	2,381,472	1,218	51.8	1,218	51.8	1,218	51.8
Algeria	2060	30,000,000	2,381,472	1,260	53.6	1,260	53.6	1,260	53.6
Algeria	2065	31,000,000	2,381,472	1,302	55.4	1,302	55.4	1,302	55.4
Algeria	2070	32,000,000	2,381,472	1,344	57.2	1,344	57.2	1,344	57.2
Algeria	2075	33,000,000	2,381,472	1,386	59.0	1,386	59.0	1,386	59.0
Algeria	2080	34,000,000	2,381,472	1,428	60.8	1,428	60.8	1,428	60.8
Algeria	2085	35,000,000	2,381,472	1,470	62.6	1,470	62.6	1,470	62.6
Algeria	2090	36,000,000	2,381,472	1,512	64.4	1,512	64.4	1,512	64.4
Algeria	2095	37,000,000	2,381,472	1,554	66.2	1,554	66.2	1,554	66.2
Algeria	2100	38,000,000	2,381,472	1,596	68.0	1,596	68.0	1,596	68.0
Algeria	2105	39,000,000	2,381,472	1,638	69.8	1,638	69.8	1,638	69.8
Algeria	2110	40,000,000	2,381,472	1,680	71.6	1,680	71.6	1,680	71.6
Algeria	2115	41,000,000	2,381,472	1,722	73.4	1,722	73.4	1,722	73.4
Algeria	2120	42,000,000	2,381,472	1,764	75.2	1,764	75.2	1,764	75.2
Algeria	2125	43,000,000	2,381,472	1,806	77.0	1,806	77.0	1,806	77.0

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Sociodemographic Characteristics of the Sample	
Characteristic	Percentage
Gender	50.0%
Age	35.0%
Education	65.0%
Income	45.0%
Marital Status	55.0%
Employment Status	60.0%
Religion	70.0%
Political Affiliation	50.0%
Health Status	65.0%
Living Arrangements	55.0%
Travel Frequency	60.0%
Travel Duration	70.0%
Travel Purpose	50.0%
Travel Satisfaction	65.0%
Travel Frequency	55.0%
Travel Duration	60.0%
Travel Purpose	70.0%
Travel Satisfaction	50.0%
Travel Frequency	65.0%
Travel Duration	55.0%
Travel Purpose	60.0%
Travel Satisfaction	70.0%

Year	Population	Area
1950	100,000	100,000
1955	110,000	110,000
1960	120,000	120,000
1965	130,000	130,000
1970	140,000	140,000
1975	150,000	150,000
1980	160,000	160,000
1985	170,000	170,000
1990	180,000	180,000
1995	190,000	190,000
2000	200,000	200,000
2005	210,000	210,000
2010	220,000	220,000
2015	230,000	230,000
2020	240,000	240,000
2025	250,000	250,000
2030	260,000	260,000
2035	270,000	270,000
2040	280,000	280,000
2045	290,000	290,000
2050	300,000	300,000
2055	310,000	310,000
2060	320,000	320,000
2065	330,000	330,000
2070	340,000	340,000
2075	350,000	350,000
2080	360,000	360,000
2085	370,000	370,000
2090	380,000	380,000
2095	390,000	390,000
2100	400,000	400,000

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Argentina	4.00
Australia	1.70
Canada	77.50
France	16.20
Germany	4.50
Italy	10.20
Japan	2.25
United Kingdom	1.02
United States	1.75
Belgium	4.75
Canada	1.65
France	6.02
Germany	1.20
Italy	1.00
Japan	70.70
United Kingdom	4.00
United States	1.75
Belgium	70.70
Canada	1.15
France	20.90
Germany	1.11
Italy	60.47
Japan	40.30
United Kingdom	1.00
United States	60.71
Belgium	1.25
Canada	2.20
France	70.60
Germany	11.40
Italy	0.60
Japan	3.00
United Kingdom	4.00
United States	40.30
Belgium	0.13
Canada	0.10
France	61.30
Germany	21.15
Italy	0.30
Japan	1.00
United Kingdom	1.00
United States	1.00
Belgium	4.02
Canada	20.00
France	100.00
Germany	10.25
Italy	2.00
Japan	70.00
United Kingdom	17.00
United States	1.00
Belgium	6.0 - 4
Canada	21.00
France	17.00
Germany	1.00
Italy	1.00
Japan	1.00
United Kingdom	2.75
United States	0.00
Belgium	20.00
Canada	0.00
France	1.00
Germany	1.00
Italy	1.00
Japan	1.00
United Kingdom	1.00
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United States	1.00
Belgium	1.00
Canada	1.00
France	1.00
Germany	1.00
Italy	1.00
Japan	1.00
United Kingdom	

	1970
Lebanon	35,000
Lebanon	14,174
Lebanon	748,738
Lebanon	17,200
Lebanon	30,000
Lebanon	4,000

	Total Population
Lebanon	20,228
Lebanon	17,200
Lebanon	7,200
Lebanon	22,000
Lebanon	21,730
Lebanon	4,077
Lebanon	20,072
Lebanon	401,000
Lebanon	30,730
Lebanon	91,000
Lebanon	47,000
Lebanon	17,000
Lebanon	30,000
Lebanon	19,000
Lebanon	120,000
Lebanon	21,000
Lebanon	60,200
Lebanon	60,000
Lebanon	14,700
Lebanon	20,000
Lebanon	24,000
Lebanon	100,000
Lebanon	40,000
Lebanon	10,000
Lebanon	91,000
Lebanon	21,000
Lebanon	100,000
Lebanon	60,000
Lebanon	11,000
Lebanon	42,000

Country	Year	Value
Algeria	1970	27.14
Algeria	1971	26.97
Algeria	1972	27.18
Algeria	1973	27.18
Algeria	1974	27.18
Algeria	1975	27.18
Algeria	1976	27.18
Algeria	1977	27.18
Algeria	1978	27.18
Algeria	1979	27.18
Algeria	1980	27.18
Algeria	1981	27.18
Algeria	1982	27.18
Algeria	1983	27.18
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Algeria	1985	27.18
Algeria	1986	27.18
Algeria	1987	27.18
Algeria	1988	27.18
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Algeria	2002	27.18
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Algeria	2004	27.18
Algeria	2005	27.18
Algeria	2006	27.18
Algeria	2007	27.18
Algeria	2008	27.18
Algeria	2009	27.18
Algeria	2010	27.18
Algeria	2011	27.18
Algeria	2012	27.18
Algeria	2013	27.18
Algeria	2014	27.18
Algeria	2015	27.18
Algeria	2016	27.18
Algeria	2017	27.18
Algeria	2018	27.18
Algeria	2019	27.18
Algeria	2020	27.18
Algeria	2021	27.18
Algeria	2022	27.18
Algeria	2023	27.18
Algeria	2024	27.18
Algeria	2025	27.18
Algeria	2026	27.18
Algeria	2027	27.18
Algeria	2028	27.18
Algeria	2029	27.18
Algeria	2030	27.18
Algeria	2031	27.18
Algeria	2032	27.18
Algeria	2033	27.18
Algeria	2034	27.18
Algeria	2035	27.18
Algeria	2036	27.18
Algeria	2037	27.18
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Algeria	2050	27.18
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Algeria	2052	27.18
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Algeria	2065	27.18
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Algeria	2067	27.18
Algeria	2068	27.18
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Algeria	2073	27.18
Algeria	2074	27.18
Algeria	2075	27.18
Algeria	2076	27.18
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Algeria	2081	27.18
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Algeria	2084	27.18
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Algeria	2088	27.18
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Algeria	2091	27.18
Algeria	2092	27.18
Algeria	2093	27.18
Algeria	2094	27.18
Algeria	2095	27.18
Algeria	2096	

1. Introduction
 2. Background
 3. Objectives
 4. Methodology
 5. Results
 6. Discussion
 7. Conclusion
 8. References
 9. Appendix
 10. Index
 11. Summary
 12. Abstract
 13. Keywords
 14. Subject
 15. Field
 16. Location
 17. Time
 18. Person
 19. Organization
 20. Equipment
 21. Materials
 22. Procedures
 23. Data
 24. Analysis
 25. Interpretation
 26. Limitations
 27. Future Research
 28. Conclusion
 29. References
 30. Appendix
 31. Index
 32. Summary
 33. Abstract
 34. Keywords
 35. Subject
 36. Field
 37. Location
 38. Time
 39. Person
 40. Organization
 41. Equipment
 42. Materials
 43. Procedures
 44. Data
 45. Analysis
 46. Interpretation
 47. Limitations
 48. Future Research
 49. Conclusion
 50. References
 51. Appendix
 52. Index
 53. Summary
 54. Abstract
 55. Keywords
 56. Subject
 57. Field
 58. Location
 59. Time
 60. Person
 61. Organization
 62. Equipment
 63. Materials
 64. Procedures
 65. Data
 66. Analysis
 67. Interpretation
 68. Limitations
 69. Future Research
 70. Conclusion
 71. References
 72. Appendix
 73. Index
 74. Summary
 75. Abstract
 76. Keywords
 77. Subject
 78. Field
 79. Location
 80. Time
 81. Person
 82. Organization
 83. Equipment
 84. Materials
 85. Procedures
 86. Data
 87. Analysis
 88. Interpretation
 89. Limitations
 90. Future Research
 91. Conclusion
 92. References
 93. Appendix
 94. Index
 95. Summary
 96. Abstract
 97. Keywords
 98. Subject
 99. Field
 100. Location
 101. Time
 102. Person
 103. Organization
 104. Equipment
 105. Materials
 106. Procedures
 107. Data
 108. Analysis
 109. Interpretation
 110. Limitations
 111. Future Research
 112. Conclusion
 113. References
 114. Appendix
 115. Index
 116. Summary
 117. Abstract
 118. Keywords
 119. Subject
 120. Field
 121. Location
 122. Time
 123. Person
 124. Organization
 125. Equipment
 126. Materials
 127. Procedures
 128. Data
 129. Analysis
 130. Interpretation
 131. Limitations
 132. Future Research
 133. Conclusion
 134. References
 135. Appendix
 136. Index
 137. Summary
 138. Abstract
 139. Keywords
 140. Subject
 141. Field
 142. Location
 143. Time
 144. Person
 145. Organization
 146. Equipment
 147. Materials
 148. Procedures
 149. Data
 150. Analysis
 151. Interpretation
 152. Limitations
 153. Future Research
 154. Conclusion
 155. References
 156. Appendix
 157. Index
 158. Summary
 159. Abstract
 160. Keywords
 161. Subject
 162. Field
 163. Location
 164. Time
 165. Person
 166. Organization
 167. Equipment
 168. Materials
 169. Procedures
 170. Data
 171. Analysis
 172. Interpretation
 173. Limitations
 174. Future Research
 175. Conclusion
 176. References
 177. Appendix
 178. Index
 179. Summary
 180. Abstract
 181. Keywords
 182. Subject
 183. Field
 184. Location
 185. Time
 186. Person
 187. Organization
 188. Equipment
 189. Materials
 190. Procedures
 191. Data
 192. Analysis
 193. Interpretation
 194. Limitations
 195. Future Research
 196. Conclusion
 197. References
 198. Appendix
 199. Index
 200. Summary
 201. Abstract
 202. Keywords
 203. Subject
 204. Field
 205. Location
 206. Time
 207. Person
 208. Organization
 209. Equipment
 210. Materials
 211. Procedures
 212. Data
 213. Analysis
 214. Interpretation
 215. Limitations
 216. Future Research
 217. Conclusion
 218. References
 219. Appendix
 220. Index
 221. Summary
 222. Abstract
 223. Keywords
 224. Subject
 225. Field
 226. Location
 227. Time
 228. Person
 229. Organization
 230. Equipment
 231. Materials
 232. Procedures
 233. Data
 234. Analysis
 235. Interpretation
 236. Limitations
 237. Future Research
 238. Conclusion
 239. References
 240. Appendix
 241. Index
 242. Summary
 243. Abstract
 244. Keywords
 245. Subject
 246. Field
 247. Location
 248. Time
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 256. Interpretation
 257. Limitations
 258. Future Research
 259. Conclusion</

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75	100	100	100
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85	100	100	100
90	100	100	100
95	100	100	100
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